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VITIATION OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE IN CIVIL ACTIONS: CLARK
v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT
A primary concern of the American system of jurisprudence is
the constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial.1 Inherent in
this concept is the right to an impartial jury of one's peers.2 The
I See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
. . ." Id. The Supreme Court has consistently held that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976) (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (1955)).
The Court has also stated that "[iln essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the crimi-
nally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 106 S. Ct.
2735, 2741 (1986) (assurances of fairness to accused); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51
(1951) (abuse may jeopardize right to fair trial).
The various provisions of the sixth amendment seek to ensure other fundamental rights
necessary to a fair trial. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process
for witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public
trial).
The seventh amendment guarantees a fair trial in the civil realm and provides: "In
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved.. ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. The rights of the parties in a
civil litigation are also assured. Cf. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966)
(purpose of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to ensure fair trial); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Day, 360 U.S. 548, 562 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (unequal procedures cannot be consid-
ered fair trial). See generally J. Now y, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
138, at 487 (3d ed. 1986) (government process must be fair and impartial).
2 See infra note 4; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-57 (1968) (jury of
peers designed "to prevent oppression by the Government."). "The American tradition of
trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily
contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community." Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942)).
The petit jury is an important extension of the public's right to be involved in the
judicial process. See Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6
Loy. LAL. REv. 247, 259 (1973). The jury system has been described as a power which
encourages compliance with the law. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 215-16 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("The jury injects a democratic element into the law."), overruled,
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); see also 1 A. DE TocQuvsE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
283 (Reeves trans. 1961).
Conversely, limitations on the jury system have been proposed by its critics. See H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966) (citing HAnvARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN'S
REPORT 5-6 (1962-63)). In that report, Dean Griswold voiced his apprehension towards the
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peremptory challenge' has long been recognized as an effective
mechanism in the selection of an impartial jury.4 A fundamental
conflict arises, however, when a peremptory challenge is exercised
in a manner which discriminatorily excludes a member of a partic-
ular racial group from a jury.5 In Swain v. Alabama,6 the Supreme
jury system and called for its abolition in civil cases. See id. The jury system has been
further criticized for its "inherent defects," and been called "a cumbersome process, not
only imposing great cost in time and money on both the State and the jurors themselves,
but also contributing to delay in the machinery of justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 188 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
I A peremptory challenge is defined as "[t]he right to challenge a juror without as-
signing a reason for the challenge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979); see Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) ("The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is
that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject
to the court's control.") (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)); see also
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1718-19 (1986) (prosecutor entitled to exercise permit-
ted peremptory challenges for any legitimate reason). A peremptory challenge may be used
by an attorney who suspects that a potential juror might not be impartial when considering
the evidence. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
To REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 146 (1977) (general discussion of challenges).
In a federal civil action, a party is allowed an unlimited number of challenges for cause,
and three peremptory challenges. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982); see also K. SINCLAIR, FEDERAL
CIVIL PRACTICE 820 (2d ed. 1986) (statutory right to three peremptory challenges).
The peremptory challenge has been traced back to the English common law. See Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965). All state and federal jurisdictions currently allow
for peremptory challenges. See J. VAN DYKE, supra, at 282-84.
' See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1986) (peremptory challenge is means
of assuring selection of qualified and unbiased jury); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965) (peremptory challenges necessary element of jury trial); Pointer v. United States, 151
U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (important right secured to accused); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892) (challenge essential to fairness of trial by jury).
"The purpose of challenges is to eliminate jurors who may be biased about the defend-
ant, the prosecution, or the case, and who thus might threaten the jury's impartiality." J.
VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 139; see also Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful
Power", 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 551 (1975) (peremptory challenges part of constitutional re-
quirement of impartial juries); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash
Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 341 (1982) (peremp-
tory challenge is "one of the most effective means of securing an impartial jury"); Comment,
Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges: Uncertainty in the Criminal Law, 44 U. PITT.
L. REV. 673 (1983) (peremptory challenge recognized as essential component of fair jury
trial).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). The right to exercise a peremptory
challenge is "subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 1718 (foot-
note omitted). The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in
selecting the jury. Id. at 1719; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965) (removal
of blacks from jury by misuse of peremptory challenges might raise fourteenth amendment
violation); Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1657
(1985) (Swain Court acknowledged potential equal protection claim); Kuhn, Jury Discrimi-
nation: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 285-93 (1968) (questioning "constitutional-
ity of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges").
1986] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Court held that such prosecutorial use of the peremptory challenge
may violate a criminal defendant's constitutional right to equal
protection. Nevertheless, the Swain Court placed the burden on
the defendant to demonstrate that such challenges were systemati-
cally employed over a period of time to exclude members of a ra-
cial group from sitting on the jury." Two decades later, in Batson
v. Kentucky," the Court eased the evidentiary burden for criminal
defendants claiming discriminatory abuse by the prosecutor, and
held that "purposeful discrimination" could be established solely
upon the facts of the defendant's case. 10 Recently, in Clark v. City
In Swain, Justice White alluded to the fact that continuous systematic exclusion of
blacks from juries through the use of peremptory challenges might violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 226-27 (1965); see also J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 3, at 150-51. But see Swain, 380 U.S. at 228 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that
constitutionality of such systematic exclusion not decided by court).
6 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
7 See id. at 223. The plurality in Swain stated that there is a presumption that the
prosecution will utilize its peremptory challenges in a fair and impartial manner. See id. at
222. In order to rebut such a presumption, the criminal defendant was required to show
that:
[T]he prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsi-
ble for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result
that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries.
Id. at 223. Under the facts of Swain, the Court found that the defendant had not met the
burden of showing invidious discrimination violative of the fourteenth amendment. See id.
at 223-24. Justices Goldberg and Douglas, along with Chief Justice Warren, dissented, argu-
ing that continuous exclusion of black citizens from the jury for over fifteen years was suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional use of the peremptory challenge. See
id. at 228-47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); see also Wihick, Prosecutorial Challenge Practices
in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1,
21-39 (1982) (discussion of difficulty of rebutting presumption of propriety in context of
capital case).
The holding in Swain, a criminal case, was based upon the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A criminal defendant's
equal protection rights are comprised of the entire character of the judicial process, includ-
ing what occurs before the trial begins. See Kuhn, supra note 5, at 289. "The equal protec-
tion clause guarantees that similar individuals will be dealt with in a similar manner. .....
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, § 14.2, at 525.
8 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. The Court recognized that the exclusion of blacks from
all juries might rebut the presumption of proper use of the challenge which had protected
the prosecutor from scrutiny. See id.
9 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
10 See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Prior to Batson, the Swain standard
had been quite burdensome and almost insurmountable during the two decades following
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of Bridgeport,1 the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut extended the test enunciated in Batson to encompass
civil as well as criminal trials. 2
In Clark, three individual plaintiffs brought a section 1983
civil rights action against two police officers and the City of
Bridgeport (the "City")."3 During jury selection, the attorney for
the defendants used his peremptory challenges to eliminate every
available black venireman from serving on the juries selected. 4
Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had discrimi-
natorily exercised their peremptory challenges. 5 The court consid-
the decision. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d
1113 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1089 (1980); United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); see also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 151 (general
discussion of challenges); Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Ma-
nipulation Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 192,
202 (1978) (near total failure of defendants attempting to meet required standard of proof);
Johnson, supra note 5, at 1658 (twenty years later, no reported cases demonstrating dis-
crimination); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 345 (although not insurmountable, few, if
any, defendants have been able to meet standard).
In two cases at the state level, courts determined that the defendant had successfully
established his prima facie case. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979); State
v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
" 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986). Clark consisted of three consolidated cases: Clark
v. City of Bridgeport; Rizzoli v. Muniz; and Simmons v. Formichella. Id. at 890, 891.
12 See id. at 893.
" See id. at 891. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute.., subjects... any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
11 Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 891, 892-93. In Clark, the plaintiff was a black woman and the
defendants exercised their peremptory challenges to remove all three blacks from the six-
teen prospective jurors. See id. at 891-92. In Rizzoli, the plaintiff was a white man and the
defendant excluded the one black potential juror. See id. at 892. In the action brought by
Benjamin Simmons, a black man, the assistant City attorney used all of his peremptory
challenges to remove the four black members who had been selected as possible jurors. See
id. In addition, counsel for the City claimed that the prospective black juror was removed
because she lived in the housing project in which the incident occurred. Id.
The selection of members to serve on the petit jury is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74
(1982). The petit jury is "[t]he ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979). The venire is "It]he list of jurors summoned to
serve as jurors for a particular term." Id. at 1395.
" Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 891. Counsel for purposes of jury selection was the same for
Clark and Rizzoli. Id. In Simmons, the plaintiff was represented by separate counsel. Id. at
892. In Clark and Rizzoli, plaintiffs, on the record at sidebar, indicated to the court that the
defendants had exercised their peremptory challenges to exclude the black jurymen. Id. at
891-92. Counsel for the plaintiffs in Simmons also indicated that the defendants appeared
19861 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
ered whether the individual trials could begin in light of the plain-
tiffs' equal protection objections to the City's apparent systematic
exclusion of black jurors."6
Chief Judge Daly required the City to show "acceptable rea-
sons" for their use of peremptory challenges against all potential
black jurors.1" The defendants' counsel explained that the prospec-
tive jurors were removed because counsel instinctively believed
that they were incapable of rendering a fair and impartial deci-
sion.18 Although unable to produce any data to confirm these be-
liefs, the assistant City attorney further asserted that the defend-
ants should not be placed at the "mercy of the people . . . who
make the most civil rights claims."1 9 The court found this explana-
tion insufficient,20 and held the defendants' use of peremptory
challenges unconstitutional.21
Although the defendants in Clark may have questionably ex-
ercised their peremptory challenges, it is submitted that the
court's application of the Batson test was incorrect. The court
erred in extending the standard developed in Batson for criminal
to be using their challenges to deprive her clients from having any blacks on the jury. Id. at
892.
See Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 892.
See id. The requirement of an "acceptable reason" is the embodiment of the stan-
dard stated in Batson. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986).
" Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 893-94. It was admitted that the "prospective jurors were
'knocked off' because [the assistant City attorney] didn't think they would give him a fair
trial, they were biased, and he thought they would show prejudice." Id. at 893. Counsel for
defendants further stated that he "thought that [his] client would get a much fairer trial if
[he] could get people who came from surrounding circumstances and who had no feeling of
kinship by race, color, or creed." Id. The assistant City attorney also stated that he was
concerned with the feelings which "permeated" the black community in Bridgeport concern-
ing the city government and the police department. Id.
11 Id. at 894.
20 See id. at 893-94. The peremptory challenge is based upon an attorney's instincts
and perceptions concerning a potential juror; the attorney need not state any reason for
exclusion of that person. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892); Babcock, supra note 4, at 550; Brown, McGuire & Winters,
supra note 10, at 193; Johnson, supra note 5, at 1656; see also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at
145 (challenge need not be defended nor approved by judge).
By comparison, the challenge for cause "permit[s] rejection of jurors on a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality." Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. See
generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 139-75 (discussion of challenging prospective jurors
for bias).
21 Clark, 645 F. Supp. at 894. The court held that the "defendants exercised their pe-
remptory challenges to exclude at least seven of the eight black prospective jurors from jury
service simply because they are black.... Such exercise of one's peremptory challenges is
constitutionally impermissible." Id.
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cases to the civil context. It will be demonstrated that equal pro-
tection considerations which restrict the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges against criminal defendants are less compel-
ling in civil litigation. This Comment will examine the Supreme
Court's effort to balance equal protection against the right to an
unhindered exercise of peremptory challenges. Finally, this Com-
ment will propose that a more exacting standard should be
adopted in the civil context when only private parties are involved.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The right to bar prospective jurors without justification from
the final jury panel has long been acknowledged in the Anglo-
American judicial process. 22 Although the Constitution requires
that a party receive a fair trial by an impartial jury,23 the Supreme
Court has held that in a criminal trial this necessitates the selec-
tion of a jury from a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity.24 Congress, however, has cut back on this principle by al-
lowing both parties in federal jury trials the right to exercise
peremptory challenges.26
" See Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-15 (history of peremptory challenge); J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 3, at 147-50 (history of peremptory challenges since introduction into English common
law).
22 See supra notes 1, 2, and 4.
24 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). In Taylor, the Court found that "the
selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." Id. at 528; see also Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (jury should reflect representative cross section of community);
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (cross-section of community necessary
for impartial jury); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (jury as truly repesentative
body of the community).
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982). Section 1870 provides: "In civil cases, each party shall
be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be
considered as a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow
additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly." Id.
The peremptory challenge is not guaranteed by any provision in the Constitution. See
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). In federal criminal trials, peremptory
challenges are governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIh. P.
24(b). Rule 24(b) states:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20 pe-
remptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and
the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the offense
charged is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine or
both, each side is entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If there is more than one
defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges
and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
These challenges significantly aid in the selection of 4n impar-
tial jury and allow an attorney to exclude bias from the jury panel
by "eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides."26 Unlike
challenges for cause, peremptory challenges require no justifica-
tion.27 A peremptory challenge is an indispensible tool for trial at-
torneys, and is used when they "instinctively" believe that a poten-
tial juror possesses negative feelings or preconceived beliefs
concerning their client's case which do not quite rise to the level of
a "removal for cause."28 Peremptory challenges, therefore, help to
insure that the jury will be impartial and will decide the case based
upon the evidence presented."
In Swain v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the sys-
tematic and discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to ex-
clude members of certain racial groups from petit juries violated a
criminal defendant's right to equal protection." However, in order
to preserve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenges,
the Swain Court relied on a presumption that the state's chal-
lenges were constitutionally exercised. 1 To overcome this pre-
sumption, the burden lay on the defendant to show a continuous,
purposeful, and systematic exclusion of members of a specific race
by that prosecutor.3 2 This approach has been criticized as present-
ing too burdensome a test for the defendant to overcome. 33
26 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. The peremptory challenge is one of the most important
tools used by the trial attorney in fulfilling the obligation to represent the client's best inter-
ests. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
1 See supra notes 3 and 20.
28 See supra notes 3 and 26.
29 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; see also W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 175
(1852) ("The right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing perfect fair-
ness and impartiality in a trial").
20 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24. The Court based its holding in Swain, a criminal case,
upon the sixth amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 219, 223-24; see supra
note 7.
" See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
2 See id. at 227.
"2 See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 166-67 (burden of proof sustained only if
accused has had associate sitting in courtrooms throughout jurisdiction over long period);
Imlay, supra note 2, at 268-70 (peremptory challenge system due for examination and
study); Kuhn, supra note 5, at 283-303 (systematic exclusion test is blind to realities and
theoretically unsound); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85
COLUM. L. Rav. 1357, 1362 (1985) (Swain imposes insurmountable burden on defendant's
proof of equal protection violation).
Prior to Batson, five members of the Supreme Court apper :ed ready to reconsider the
Swain decision. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), denying cert. to People v.
1986]
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In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court relaxed the burden
imposed on a criminal defendant by Swain.4 Under Batson, a
criminal defendant can rely upon the particular facts of his own
case to establish a prima facie case of illegitimate use of peremp-
tory challenges by the state. 5 Once the defendant establishes a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to give a
"neutral explanation" for the challenges." If the reasons set forth
by the prosecutor do not satisfy the court, the peremptory chal-
lenge is not allowed and the jury is dismissed.3 7
Although Batson affords a criminal defendant a more realistic
opportunity to thwart discriminatory trial practice than Swain, it
is submitted that the Supreme Court's balancing of a defendant's
equal protection guarantees with the right to exercise peremptory
challenges in Batson has in effect emasculated the legitimate use
and power of the peremptory challenge. The explanatory require-
ment could well effect the abrogation of the peremptory challenge
even in situations where it is utilized in a valid manner.3 8
McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982), People v. Miller, 104 Inl.
App. 3d 1205, 437 N.E.2d 945 (1982) (mem.), and State v. Perry, 420 So. 2d 139 (La. 1982)
(mem.). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari because "it is
difficult to understand why several must suffer discrimination ... before any defendant can
object." Id. at 965 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Powell, while agreeing with Justice Marshall's opinion of the underlying issue, felt that
further consideration of the issue in state courts should precede a Supreme Court decision.
See id. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1247
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984) (Swain holding
may no longer be good law). In addition, some state courts had circumvented the Swain
holding by basing decisions on their respective state constitutions. See People v. Wheeler,
22 Cal. 3d 258, 265, 583 P.2d 748, 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1978); Commonwealth v.
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 467, 387 N.E.2d 499, 508, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
" See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-23. In contrast to Swain, the Supreme Court in Bat-
son decided the case based solely upon an equal protection analysis. See id. at 1716 n.4 (no
views expressed on merits of sixth amendment argument).
" See id. at 1722-23.
36 Id. at 1723.
"' See Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 898. In Clark, the court dismissed
the jury when it concluded that the defendants had used their peremptory challenges to
illegitimately remove the black jurors. Id.
For example, if a criminal defendant can establish a prima facie case and the court
does not accept the prosecution's explanation as reasonable, it is possible that, if the prose-
cutor subsequently attempts to use a peremptory challenge on a member of the same racial
group, the court will disallow the challenge. As a result, the prosecutor might be denied the
valid use of a peremptory challenge even in a situation where the challenge is not
discriminatory.
Peremptory challenges are "exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court's control." See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220; see also Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) ("arbitrary and capricious right"). The effect of
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
INAPPROPRIATE USE OF CRIMINAL STANDARD IN CIVIL CASES
Although there is an inherent right to equal protection guar-
antees, there is also an integral prerogative to exercise peremptory
challenges in an unfettered manner.39 The Supreme Court has cir-
cumscribed the use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases
when such challenges are "clearly" based on discriminatory in-
tent.40 Although such a restriction may be necessary to protect a
criminal defendant's equal protection interests, it is submitted that
there is a fundamental difference between civil and criminal jury
trials which diminishes the propriety of extending the Batson test
to civil litigation.
Denial of peremptory challenges may be justified in the crimi-
nal context because of the nature of the interests involved. The
defendant's freedom, which is at stake in criminal cases, is not at
risk in civil litigation.4 1 Therefore, the burden imposed upon the
criminal defendant to demonstrate an abuse of peremptory chal-
lenges should be less than that placed on the civil litigant.42 Ac-
cordingly, it is proposed that the inherent differences between civil
and criminal trials dictate that separate and distinct tests should
be applied to each.
requiring a "neutral explanation" directly abrogates the purpose of a peremptory challenge.
See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1739 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Court in Swain stated that
"[t]o subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and tradi-
tional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature
and operation of the challenge ... [that] [t]he challenge... would no longer be peremp-
tory. . . "Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22. Any imposition of an explanatory requirement renders
the challenge non-peremptory. See id. at 222.
31 It is submitted that the peremptory challenge is an important instrument for the
trial attorney, the use of which is essential in obtaining the best possible jury for his client.
See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (party may legiti-
mately pursue goal of maximizing his own chances of winning).
40 See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1717-19; Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
41 See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 4 (1985); K.
SINCLAIR, supra note 3, at 31. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF REMEDIES
(1973) (survey of various remedies available in civil litigation). Civil litigants, however, also
have an interest in seeking an impartial jury even though "[l]ife and liberty may not be
involved ... important property rights frequently are." Kuhn, supra note 5, at 244.
42 It is submitted that the distinction between the potential consequences of civil and
criminal trials is so sharp that any alleged abuse should'be scrutinized in a different man-
ner. In a civil trial, any implication of misuse should be weighed against a strong presump-
tion of legitimacy. Therefore, a heavier burden must be met to offset this added weight in
order to rebut the presumption that the peremptory challenge is constitutional.
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PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR CIVIL CASES
The Supreme Court's promulgation of a more lenient test for
proving discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a criminal
trial setting may result in the vitiation of the peremptory chal-
lenge.4 The effect of the Clark court's interpretation of Batson has
been to allow this restricted form of peremptory challenge to spill
over into civil cases in which there has been state action.44 It is
suggested that the Supreme Court did not intend to extend this
restriction on peremptory challenges into the "civil arena". This
view is supported by the Court's silence concerning a standard for
its use.45 It is submitted, however, that while the test enunciated in
Batson might be applicable to civil cases where state action is in-
volved,46 the more rigorous standard of Swain should be the test in
cases involving only private parties.47
In civil cases involving only private litigants, no equal protec-
tion claim arises when one of the parties uses a peremptory chal-
lenge discriminatorily. 48 Constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
individual ensure protection from governmental interference. 49
43 See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
222 (1965) (challenges open to examination are no longer peremptory).
4' See Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Conn. 1986) (application of
Batson burden of proof to civil case).
41 See Batson, 380 U.S. at 1724. The Supreme Court explicitly referred to the effect
which this standard would have on the criminal justice system, stating "fin view of the ...
public respect for our criminal justice system ... we ensure that no citizen is disqualified
from jury service because of his race." Id.; see also id. at 1724, n.22 (reference to prosecu-
tors' duty to use challenges legitmately).
4'6 See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 499-500 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting
McCray test).
47 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24; see also King, 581 F. Supp. at 499 (Swain applicable
to both civil and criminal cases).
48 See King, 581 F. Supp. at 499. It is more difficult to prove the discriminatory nature
of a peremptory challenge by a private litigant or show that the court's acceptance of dis-
criminatory challenges constitutes governmental action. See id.; see also infra note 50 (dis-
cussing court conduct as equivalent of state action).
41 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, § 12.1, at 421 (constitutional
protection of individual rights and liberties apply to actions of governmental entities); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAh CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1147 (1978) (guarantees against govern-
mental action). Constitutional protection is afforded against individuals if their acts are
deemed to constitute "state action." See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, §
12.1, at 421. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (debtor may chal-
lenge creditor's acquisition of pretrial writ of attachment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (company towns subject to first and fourteenth amendments); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) (white primary system violates fifteenth amendment); see also Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state action in sale of debtor's goods by warehouse-
man with lien on goods); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (first amendment does not
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Under the Swain standard, the burden of proving discriminatory
intent would be substantial, and if "apparently overcome" and un-
reasonably rejected by the court, such conduct by the trial court
might be deemed, on appeal, to constitute the "state action" re-
quired in the averment of an equal protection violation.50 Conse-
quently, both party's equal protection rights would be upheld
without impairing the practical use of the peremptory challenge.
In addition, requiring the party asserting discrimination to
prove that his adversary has over a period of time used peremptory
challenges to purposefully exclude a cognizable racial group from
jurieS5 1 insures that such challenges are raised only in clear cases of
abuse.2 Consequently, the function of peremptory challenges will
not be undercut in civil litigation between private parties where
equal interests are at issue.5 3 Furthermore, in a civil jury trial
neither of the private parties' liberty interests are jeopardized, yet
denial of the peremptory challenge may in fact adversely affect one
of the litigants' constitutional right to a fair trial.5 4 The peremp-
tory challenge is recognized as one of the traditional mechanisms
for procuring an impartial jury. 5 A rigid test, similar to that of
Swain, would be consistent with the equal protection doctrine and
still preserve the peremptory challenge.
It is submitted that in cases like Clark, where the state is a
party, the Batson approach to discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges may be appropriate because of the implication of equal pro-
apply to privately owned shopping centers); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974) (power company not public function constituting state action).
50 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 1, § 12.1, at 421. "When a...
court takes some official action against an individual, that action is subjected to review
under the Constitution, for the official act of any governmental agency is direct governmen-
tal action and therefore subject to the restraints of the Constitution." Id. "[A]ctions of any
governmental entity give[s] rise to state action for the purposes of constitutional limita-
tions." Id. at 422. Cf. PalImore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state court order could not
survive strict scrutiny); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (involvement of
state judicial system in issuing writ of attachment sufficient to establish state action). But
see King, 581 F. Supp. at 499 (hard to prove such governmental action).
51 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
52 See id. at 222. There is a presumption that a lawyer will use the peremptory chal-
lenge in a legitimate manner. Id.
It is suggested that an attorney will be careful in using peremptory challenges for the
practical reason that the individual removed may be replaced with one even less desirable.
See J. VAN DimE, supra note 3, at 146.
53 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 222; supra note 52.
" It is submitted that foreclosure of the peremptory challenge may allow a "biased"
juror to avoid removal and consequently affect the outcome of a trial.
5 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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tection interests arising out of state action. The danger is, however,
that courts will apply Batson to all civil cases regardless of the
parties involved, and thus undercut the value of peremptory
challenges.
CONCLUSION
Although the facts in Clark may be satisfactory to show pur-
poseful discrimination by a defendant who exercised peremptory
challenges in a matter involving state action, the court's applica-
tion of the Batson standard does not appear to be as meritorious
as in a criminal action. In a civil case, the peremptory challenge is
an invaluable right which should not be cast aside on the mere
suspicion that a discriminatory purpose underlies an attempt at
excluding a potential juryman. The standard formulated by the
Supreme Court in Batson should not be extended to civil cases in-
volving only private litigants because it would appear to allow a
party to readily abrogate an adversary's rights. Establishing a more
rigid criterion would preserve the peremptory challenge and still
provide for equal protection under the law.
David M. Kaston
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